Interacting with Users
Last updated
Last updated
procmon.ps1
Docker Desktop Community Edition before 2.1.0.1.
The program looks for docker-credential-wincred.exe
and docker-credential-wincred.bat
files in the C:\PROGRAMDATA\DockerDesktop\version-bin\
. This directory was misconfigured to allow full write access to the BUILTIN\Users
group, meaning that any authenticated user on the system could write a file into it (such as a malicious executable).
Any executable placed in that directory would run when a) the Docker application starts and b) when a user authenticates using the command docker login
.
Using SCFs no longer works on Server 2019 hosts, but we can achieve the same effect using a malicious .lnk file.
@Inventory.scf
ntlm_theft supports the following attack types:
Browse to Folder Containing
.url – via URL field
.url – via ICONFILE field
.lnk - via icon_location field
.scf – via ICONFILE field (Not Working on Latest Windows)
autorun.inf via OPEN field (Not Working on Latest Windows)
desktop.ini - via IconResource field (Not Working on Latest Windows)
Open Document
.xml – via Microsoft Word external stylesheet
.xml – via Microsoft Word includepicture field
.htm – via Chrome & IE & Edge img src (only if opened locally, not hosted)
.docx – via Microsoft Word includepicture field
.docx – via Microsoft Word external template
.docx – via Microsoft Word frameset webSettings
.xlsx - via Microsoft Excel external cell
.wax - via Windows Media Player playlist (Better, primary open)
.asx – via Windows Media Player playlist (Better, primary open)
.m3u – via Windows Media Player playlist (Worse, Win10 opens first in Groovy)
.jnlp – via Java external jar
.application – via any Browser (Must be served via a browser downloaded or won’t run)
Open Document and Accept Popup
.pdf – via Adobe Acrobat Reader
Click Link in Chat Program
.txt – formatted link to paste into Zoom chat
Generating a Malicious .lnk File
This attack also works with .url
files and responder -I eth0 -v
Word, ppt, scf, lnk, etc